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But the real pressure at the bottom level, at the places where the 
cases are being generated and at the places where the plans are being 
drawn, is to draw nice, neat, pretty districts that comply with whatever 
the Supreme Court might think of as traditional districting principles. 
Although there never have been traditional districting principles, 
allegiance to the Court's vision of these principles will at least to some 
extent protect districts from challenge. 
And I suspect that has some possible implications. I suspect that it 
means that it may be harder to draw districts with as high a percent-
age of minority voters, so jurisdictions will opt for districts that may 
be closer to fifty-fifty districts or fifty-five-forty-five districts, although 
certainly that didn't save the district in Shaw from challenge. 
I think those are some of the implications we can look for as the 
courts and lawyers on both sides struggle with how to comply with a 
standard where the Court gave almost no guidance on what that 
standard is, or how to draw districts that avoid litigation. 
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: Well, I should say first that I did testify or 
at least wrote reports in both North Carolina and Texas. 
I want to go back to the original Shaw v. Reno opinion to try to put 
these succeeding cases in context. One of the things that strikes you 
most if you look at Shaw v. Reno is how few facts they had. It was a 
case that had been dismissed, and the question was whether there was 
a cause of action at all. And there are almost no facts in it, and most 
of the ones that are there are wrong. 
For example, the only mention of the degree of "segregation" in 
the districts is in a footnote inJustice White's dissent in which he says 
the 12th District is 54.71% black. And they didn't have any evidence 
at all about the historical nature of redistricting in North Carolina. 
In the plaintiffs brief before the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno, 
it says, "There has never been a racial gerrymander in North Carolina 
before. Just look at the shapes of the districts." 
Now, he knew that that was incorrect. In fact, in 1981 there was a 
six-month deadlock in the state legislature because they wanted to 
draw a district to protect a very conservative white incumbent, and 
they wanted to draw it to exclude Durham, which is where all these 
people who were plaintiffs in Shaw v. Reno came from. They wanted 
to exclude Durham because they didn't want to draw a district that a 
black had a fair chance to get elected in. 
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That was overturned by the Justice Department, a section 5 
objection. That was surely on record. But the Supreme Court didn't 
take any of this into account. 
It seems to me that Shaw v. Reno ought to be seen as an intent case, 
and it ought to be seen as an intent case that goes back on remand 
to the lower courts, and it says, "All right, on the face of it, it would 
look like this district was drawn only because of race. But we want 
more evidence on this. Is this the only thing?" 
And Justice O'Connor again and again in her opinion says this is 
the only reason why the districts were drawn. 
Kay Butler, in her previous remarks, uses the same terms. And yet 
we all know that that is not true. We know that this district, if you 
look at it, the 12th District in North Carolina or the districts in Dallas 
or Houston, were drawn in the particular shape they were in and 
would have the particular compactness score that they have because 
of a whole variety of reasons. 
Lots of things go into districting: incumbent protection, partisan-
ship, where a certain legislative assistant lives, where a Congressman 
lives. All sorts of things go into districting, and that is what results in 
the shapes of districts. 
So it seems to me that what we ought to do in seeing the remand 
cases is to say that the Supreme Court is asking for more evidence on 
these sorts of questions: What is the nature of the districting process? 
Is there any historical discrimination in the process of redistricting 
itself-a specific thing, not general societal redistricting-to be 
alleviated here? And then we should ask whether the lower courts 
have done a very good job in answering what seems to me to be the 
focus of the questions by the Supreme Court. And I think the answer 
to that is "no." And unfortunately, I think that is true in Judge 
Phillips's opinion as well as the bizarre opinion in Hays v. Louisiana 
and the less bizarre but still strange opinion in Vera v. Richards, the 
Texas case. 
I think that the best way to get at those sorts of questions is to look 
at a huge array of specific evidence. That evidence was presented in 
Shaw v. Reno; it was presented in great detail in Vera v. Richards. But 
the district court judges basically ignored it-in Vera v. Richards in 
particular. 
And I think one of the things that is likely to happen in the 
Supreme Court is that either that evidence is going to be presented 
or they are going to assume that it isn't in existence or they're going 
to ask for more evidence, as far as you could interpret the Hays 
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vacating of the opinion as asking for more evidence or looking at 
further empirical evidence. 
So it seems to me that there are a whole series of empirical 
questions which are raised by Shaw v. Reno, which are not settled, and 
which the district court cases ought to settle. 
MODERATOR: How can they settle them? If they take the 
broad-minded reading that you suggest, it would be clear that all of 
these districts would pass the strict scrutiny hurdle. So, for Shaw v. 
Reno to have any of its guts left, you would have to read Justice 
O'Connor as saying that as long as race is a substantial factor at all, 
the districts have to fall. Isn't that right? 
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: I am not sure. That's not what she says. 
She says "sole factor." One of the questions when it goes up again is 
did she mean that? If she says it means substantial factor, then the 
Supreme Court or a set of district courts is going to have to lay out 
some principles by which we can decide whether there was a racial 
intent in the gerrymandering. How substantial does substantial have 
to be? That question certainly has not been ·addressed so far. 
And it certainly can't be addressed within the mechanical compact-
ness standard. It's going to have to be addressed in a much more 
fact-laden, empirical framework. And district courts ought to be very 
good at that, at dealing with the huge amount of evidence. But they 
haven't been, so far. 
MODERATOR: Anita Hodgkiss, let me come to you. You have 
been a lawyer in the Shaw v. Reno case on remand. Why did the 
district court there say that there was a sufficient compelling interest, 
and in what ways was the solution of creating the two minority 
districts narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose? 
MS. HODGKISS: I actually think that Judge Phillips did a good job 
on both those questions. He said that there were three compelling 
state interests. 
The first was compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
and he said that earlier plans that had been presented to the North 
Carolina legislature as well as the very plan that the Republican 
intervenor plaintiffs in the litigation presented to the Court both 
showed that it was possible to draw two compact majority-black 
districts in North Carolina, thereby meeting the Gingles threshold 
requirement. 
And once you do that, the state legislature then has the discretion 
to draw the districts in whatever portion of the state they want to and 
to have whatever shape they want to, in line with all the other 
considerations that the legislature needs to take into account. 
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important-and there is a whole political science literature on 
this-then indeed these districts did conform. 
We showed that the North Carolina plan was more distinctive than 
any previous plan, that the districts as a whole better represented, 
independent of race, the diversity of districts in the State. In other 
words, we compiled a whole series of empirical demonstrations 
showing that indeed there was no impact on innocent third parties 
and that, in fact, these so-called dysfunctional districts functioned 
better than more traditionally compact districts. 
Now, would that hold elsewhere? Would you find those same 
characteristics? The answer is we don't know. There certainly, for 
example, in Texas, was not evidence that the districts in the urban 
areas shared the same kind of socioeconomic homogeneity of the 
districts in North Carolina, and that argument was not made in the 
State of Texas. 
So by no means are these things determined. And once we get 
away from this narrow fixation with compactness and look at the real 
issues of whether districts function or not, I think there are reason-
able standards for judging these districts. 
MODERATOR: Let's go back to two words in Justice O'Connor's 
opinion in Shaw v. Reno: "political apartheid." To what extent is 
there a symbolic injury in being forced to live in a district or a state 
where certain voters have obviously been "corralled," in the language 
of some of the lower courts, into particular areas because of their 
race? Is this something that is being litigated? Is this something 
where evidence is being taken at the lower courts about whether there 
is such a symbolic or even emotional injury? 
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: I should point out that the first racial 
gerrymandering congressional districts in North Carolina came in 
1871-72. There was a district called the Black 2nd. It is the only 
district in the South during the 19th century that has a biography 
written about it. 
The State was approximately one-third black, and it was the only 
majority-black congressional district drawn in the state, and it was 
drawn in a very self-conscious manner. So if there is a symbolic injury 
from racial gerrymanders, it is a symbolic injury that black people 
have had to be putting up with since very shortly after the promulga-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment, and it is strange that the Supreme 
Court should decide it now and that it is something that only white 
people get a chance to talk about. 
There was an inevitable conflict between two conceptions of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, I think. When Justice O'Connor 
1994] VOTING RIGHTS CONFERENCE 
.. 
:'.; 
·' 
~ ' • -~ > • :· ' ~ '', • 
.l • ..... ·'··". 
51 
discusses the 14th Amendment in Shaw v. Reno, she uses the phrase 
"discrimination between." Generally, when we have thought of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and other amendments in the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments previously, we have thought of "discrimination 
against." And in some sense, most of the time in American history 
since Reconstruction has been a story of racial discrimination in 
which there hasn't been any distinction between discrimination 
between and discrimination against. 
Discrimination between black people and white people or black 
people and Latinos, black people and Asians, white people and 
Asians, anybody like that, has always been against the people of color 
as well as between. 
Here, she seems to finesse the issue of injury by talking about 
discrimination between. And it seems to me that one way that we can 
think about the conflict between Shaw v. Reno, at least in its initial 
guise, in these opinions in their initial guise, and the trend of 
minority vote dilution cases, is to distinguish between discrimination 
between and discrimination against. 
And it seems to me what the Supreme Court fundamentally has to 
face in any consideration, further consideration of such issues, is 
when you come to the question of when discrimination between and 
discrimination against are not entirely compatible, then what do you 
do? 
In the Croson line of cases, and other sorts of things, you have 
discrimination at least allegedly against, and not purely discrimination 
between. There is allegedly injury there which is relatively concrete. 
The company, in Croson, lost a contract to produce urinals for the City 
of Richmond, and they were angry at this. And so there was some 
injury. 
In Shaw, the injury is not at all clear. One more fact indicates from 
the depositions that the injury is not clear, and that is, Ruth Shaw, the 
named plaintiff, voted for Mel Watt, she says, in the 1992 election. If 
she was not represented, why did she vote for him? 
MS. HAIR: I think this question of political apartheid is very 
important, and I think it's important to go back and look at what 
Justice O'Connor said about what the indicia are of this condition of 
political apartheid or racial gerrymander. 
When she tried to identify injuries, the types of injuries that she 
identified were that the districts were likely to lead to the election of 
congressional representatives who owed their election to only one 
race and therefore were answerable only to constituents of one race. 
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the facts that our witnesses presented, and these were the arguments 
that our lawyers made." 
You know, it seems to me that at least the audience ought to 
recognize that this is a partisan panel and that this is a partisan 
presentation by a partisan witness and indeed somebody else may look 
at those facts-! am not sufficiendy familiar with the North Carolina 
case to comment-but I believe before Professor Kousser makes his 
remarks, that it's important that you understand that perspective. 
MODERATOR: Okay. Professor Buder, thank you for that 
intervention. 
I would like to say that we have made an effort to have several 
points of view represented here. There is no monolithic ideology 
represented on this panel, and I think anyone who has participated 
in these discussions has seen that there is a diversity of views about 
the value of these districts, about alternatives to these districts, and 
your presence here demonstrates a commitment to finding other 
voices. But if you are unhappy with that! we'll just have to do better 
next time. 
Professor Kousser, please proceed. 
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: I would be happy to have anybody else 
look at this same information, and you can come to whatever 
conclusions you want. Figure 1 and figure 2 are drawn from the 
Congressional Quarterly Conservative Coalition scores, which are 
readily available in the Congressional Quarterly annual index to 
anybody. 
I have divided Congresspeople in North Carolina into three groups. 
If you look at the Conservative Coalition scores, I divided the 
Members of Congress into three groups. One is Republicans. I 
looked at the Conservative Coalition indexes for 1973 to 1993. 
Republicans are the ones up at the top. They are always around 
ninety percent or ninety percent-plus Conservative Coalition scores. 
If you look at the Democrats from the two districts that have the 
largest proportion black, the 1st and 2nd Districts up through 1991, 
those are white Democrats. Those are the squares. And those people 
are about sixty to seventy percent, they started up even higher on the 
Conservative Coalition index. Up through 1980, they looked just like 
Republicans, despite the fact that these are what would be expected 
to be minority-influenced districts. 
PROFESSOR PARKER: These are the ones that are supposed to be 
most responsive to minority interests. 
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: That's correct. 
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Fig. 1: Do White and Black Congressmen 
Differ in North Carolina? 
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PROFESSOR PARKER: Because they are from districts that are 
thirty to forty percent black? 
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: That's correct. 
The other Democrats from districts with smaller proportions of 
minorities are the little crosses. They start at around eighty percent 
conservative; they go down to perhaps seventy percent. They are 
indistinguishable, basically. Mter 1980, they are basically indistin-
guishable from the other districts. 
Obviously, the thing that should catch your eye is what happens in 
1993. For the first time since 1898 you elect Members of Congress 
who are black from North Carolina and their Conservative Coalition 
scores average about ten. 
Blacks had been excluded, in the views that black voters had before 
1993, they had been excluded from representation in Congress. 
Finally, they get included. 
Now, you could choose another index. If you chose any of the rest 
of the normal indexes that are used, the ADA index, the American 
Conservative Action, the Chamber of Commerce index, you would 
find roughly the same thing. The correlations between the Conserva-
tive Coalition scores and the others show that they are roughly the 
same. 
Was this something that just happened because of a time effect that 
was because you've got a Clinton Administration and you suddenly got 
people who would vote very liberally? Well, if you look at the rest of 
the black Members of Congress from the South in figure 2, they are 
on the lower part of the scale. They are approximately ten to twenty 
percent conservative. Mel Watt and Eva Clayton come right in that 
area. 
So, it appears that they were not different from what would have 
happened before if there had been majority-black districts, if blacks 
would have gotten their policy views represented. Until you get black-
majority districts, in North Carolina at least, it certainly doesn't 
happen. 
So, if you ask the third empirical question that Justice O'Connor 
asks, which is, "Do you get people who are responsive to only one 
constituency, once you get black-majority districts or minority-
opportunity districts drawn," the answer to the question is probably 
"no," in general. 
But if you flip the question over and you say, "Unless you have 
black-majority or majority-opportunity districts-minority opportunity 
districts, do you get representatives who are white, but who are 
favorable to the minorities," then the answer for North Carolina is 
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"no." You don't get people who are favorable to minority interests 
until you get minority-opportunity districts drawn. There is exclusion. 
There is segregation of white congressional opinion. .Blacks are 
segregated out, their influence is segregated out until you get 
minority-opportunity districts drawn. 
So it is an empirical question. Anybody can draw these sorts of 
things. Anybody can critique these sorts of things. In this sense, this 
is an extremely objective way to look at it. It is not simply a partisan 
thing on the part of the voting rights lobby or anyone else. But this 
is the fact of the matter. Blacks were excluded. 
MS. KING: I think it would be a very interesting concept, Dr. 
Kousser, and it's a very realistic concept. In the johnson v. Miller case, 
although I thought it was a very ridiculous theory, one of the harms 
that was set forth by the moving party was that this was the precise 
harm that they were alleging, that issues were being raised on the 
congressional floor that were contrary to the interests of Republicans 
and conservatives, such as the crime bill's Racialjustice Act, and the 
fact that you were allowing minorities to be represented disallowed 
the representation of the majority people in a particular district 
because these issues were being raised on the floor and these issues 
were being voted upon by minority Members of Congress. 
I think that is the danger of Shaw v. Reno, and it goes far beyond 
partisan politics, and it really gets down to issues that are being raised 
and issues which certain individuals do not want to be discussed in 
these political debates. 
PROFESSOR PARKER: The data from Mississippi also support 
Professor Kousser's conclusions. I was not involved-well, let me say, 
first of all, I had nothing to do with the North Carolina case, I wasn't 
a lawyer in the North Carolina case, I wasn't a witness in the North 
Carolina case, so I can be an unbiased, impartial panelist here. 
The same thing is true. Webb Franklin was elected in a Mississippi 
congressional district, the 2nd Congressional District, which was forty-
eight percent black in voting age population in 1992 and 1994. He 
voted as high on the Conservative Coalition scale, voted against black 
interests. 
And also, Mike Parker, who represents a congressional district, a 
white Representative in the congressional district in Mississippi that 
is over thirty percent black, voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
MODERATOR: So is the contrary hypothesis then that the 
presence of a substantial minority but a distinct minority-say, twenty 
to thirty percent of blacks in an overwhelmingly white dis-
trict-encourages at least racially coded politics by conservative 
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